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The Screening Effect of the Private
Securities Litigation Reform Act
Stephen J. Choi, Karen K. Nelson, and A. C. Pritchard*
Prior research shows that the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act
(PSLRA) increased the significance of merit-related factors in determining
the incidence and outcomes of securities fraud class actions (Johnson et al.
2007). We examine two possible explanations for this finding: the PSLRA
may have reduced the incidence of nonmeritorious litigation, or it may have
changed the definition of merit, effectively precluding claims that would have
survived and produced a settlement pre-PSLRA. We find no evidence that
pre-PSLRA claims that settled for nuisance value would be less likely to be
filed under the PSLRA regime. There is evidence, however, that pre-PSLRA
nonnuisance claims would be less likely to be filed under the PSLRA regime.
The latter result, which we refer to as the screening effect, is particularly
pronounced for claims lacking hard evidence of securities fraud or abnor-
mal insider trading. We find only limited evidence of a similar screening
effect for case outcomes.
I. INTRODUCTION
What is a "meritorious" securities fraud class action? The only clear answer to
this question is a suit that produces a judgment after trial. Trials, however,
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are almost unheard of in this area; cases that are not dismissed are settled. A
broader answer to the question is a case that produces a settlement instead
of being dismissed. This answer is little better than the first, however,
because defendants, anxious to avoid the distraction of litigation, high
defense attorney fees, negative publicity surrounding a securities lawsuit, and
the specter of potentially bankrupting damages, may be willing to pay a
"nuisance" settlement to make the case go away, even when they perceive the
likelihood of the plaintiff succeeding at trial as rather low (Pritchard 1999).
As a policy matter, if we could screen out suits filed for their nuisance value,
while leaving unobstructed suits with substantial evidence of merit, the liti-
gation process would be unambiguously improved. Unfortunately, the diffi-
culty of assessing merit without a judgment makes it impossible to measure
precisely the proportion of nuisance settlements to settlements based on the
strength of the claims.
Notwithstanding the difficulties inherent in assessing merit in securi-
ties fraud class actions, Congress accepted the argument that plaintiffs'
attorneys were filing large numbers of claims without substantial evidence of
fraud in an effort to "extort" nuisance settlements from defendants. To
discourage such "frivolous" litigation, Congress enacted the Private Securi-
ties Litigation Reform Act (PSLRA) in 1995. The goal of the legislation is to
make settlement negotiations turn more on the strength of the evidence of
fraud and less on the defense costs to be avoided by settlement.
The PSRLA includes a number of procedural provisions intended to
filter out weaker claims early in the litigation process and thereby reduce the
costs of defending nonmeritorious litigation. These procedural barriers have
resulted in a higher percentage of securities fraud class actions being dis-
missed (Foster et al. 2000). The number of suits being filed, however, has not
declined. After an initial dip, the number of securities fraud class actions has
returned to, and even exceeded in some years, its pre-PSLRA level (Foster
et al. 2007). The larger number of filings suggests that the PSLRA may have
done little to discourage the filing of frivolous suits, although it may have
increased their likelihood of dismissal. A contrary view, however, is that the
incidence of fraud may have increased even faster than the increase in class
action filings. All else equal, the procedural barriers of the PSLRA likely
raised the cost to plaintiffs' attorneys of pursuing a class action and reduced
the expected outcome from litigation. If this view is correct, the barriers
erected by the PSLRA may be discouraging not only frivolous litigation, but
also screening out litigation that would have been deemed meritorious
under the pre-PSLRA standards.
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Our study is the first to measure the magnitude of this screening effect.
We collect two samples of securities class actions involving allegations of
secondary market fraud-one from 1991 to 1995 (pre-PSLRA) and one from
1996 to 2000 (post-PSLRA). Each sued firm is matched with a nonsued firm
from the same industry and time period. The matching procedure allows us
to construct a litigation prediction model for each period based on the firms'
characteristics, including market capitalization, share turnover, stock price
drop, accounting restatements, insider trading, earnings forecasts, and a
variety of governance factors.
We apply our post-PSLRA litigation prediction model to the pre-PSLRA
sample. By comparing the model's predictions with the actual incidence of
suits, we can identify which firms would have been sued (or not sued) had
the PSLRA's provisions been in effect during the pre-PSLRA period. The
firms that the PSLRA model predicts should not have been sued but in fact
were sued and that paid a nonnuisance settlement in the pre-PSLRA period
provide a measure of the screening effect of the PSLRA. Our screening
analysis allows us to present evidence on the proportion of firms that proved
a profitable target for a securities class action in the pre-PSLRA period but
not in the post-PSLRA period.
The screening may not all occur at the time the decision to file is made;
additional screening may be done during the litigation process. Accordingly,
we conduct a similar analysis using a settlements model, allowing us to
identify firms that paid a settlement greater than nuisance value in the
pre-PSLRA period, but who likely would not have done so had the PSLRA
been in effect at the time.
We do not find statistically significant evidence that nuisance suits
have been discouraged. Our results, however, suggest the PSLRA has had
a screening effect; a substantial percentage of suits that would have
resulted in a nonnuisance settlement prior to the PSLRA would not have
been filed after Congress adopted the PSLRA. The screening effect dimin-
ishes, however, if we consider cases with "hard evidence" of securities
fraud-a restatement of earnings or revenues or an investigation by the
SEC-or abnormal insider trading. Evidence of a similar screening effect
with respect to outcomes, however, is weaker; the actual incidence of non-
nuisance settlements is only marginally less than that predicted by the
PSLRA model.
The article proceeds as follows. Section II provides institutional back-
ground on the PSLRA and discusses related research. Section III develops
our hypotheses. Section IV describes the sample selection procedure and
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data collected. Section V presents our results. Section VI concludes the
article with a summary and discussion of our major findings.
II. BACKGROUND
A. The Private Securities Litigation Reform Act
After extensive hearings, Congress concluded in 1995 that the potentially
enormous damages in securities fraud class actions were encouraging frivo-
lous "strike" suits (H.R. Rep. 1995; S. Rep. 1995). To check these perceived
abuses, Congress enacted the PSLRA into law on December 22, 1995. The
PSLRA contains a number of new hurdles for plaintiffs filing securities fraud
complaints. Perhaps most daunting of these hurdles is the PSLRA's safe
harbor for the voluntary disclosure of financial projections and other
forward-looking information.' To qualify for safe-harbor protection, the
statements must be identified as forward looking and be accompanied by
"meaningful" cautionary language discussing important factors that could
cause actual results to differ from those projected.2 In the absence of an
appropriate disclaimer, the plaintiff must still prove that the statements were
made with actual knowledge that they were false or misleading.
A more pervasive barrier to weak claims is the PSLRA's stringent plead-
ing standard, which makes it more difficult for plaintiffs to allege securities
fraud without specific evidence of misconduct.' Plaintiffs must specify in
their complaint each statement alleged to have been misleading and the
reasons the statement is misleading. In addition, plaintiffs must state with
particularity facts giving rise to a "strong inference" that the defendant acted
with "the required state of mind," that is, with fraudulent intent.
Both the forward-looking safe harbor and the pleading standard are
reinforced by the PSLRA's discovery stay, preventing plaintiffs from conduct-
'See Exchange Act § 21E.
2Nelson and Pritchard (2007) investigate firms' use of safe-harbor cautionary language, devel-
oping metrics to capture three attributes of "meaningful" cautionary language suggested by the
PSLRA's legislative history and subsequent court decisions. As predicted, the findings show that
firms subject to greater litigation risk disclose more cautionary language, update the language
more from year to year so that it is less boilerplate, and use language that is more easily
understood by the average investor.
3Exchange Act § 21D(b) (2).
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ing discovery while a motion to dismiss is pending.4 This provision is
intended to prevent plaintiffs from engaging in a "fishing expedition" for
evidence to build their case, which could cause defendants to settle dubious
claims simply to avoid the high cost of discovery. Without discovery until
after the motion to dismiss has been decided, however, plaintiffs' attorneys
face a higher cost in determining the presence of specific misleading state-
ments and omissions and the materiality of such misstatements and omis-
sions. Moreover, plaintiffs face a difficult time in gathering facts related to
the state of mind of the defendants, which the PSLRA's pleading standard
makes a critical question in resolving the motion to dismiss.
Another significant provision of the PSLRA requires courts to review
a securities fraud class action after the "final adjudication," and impose
sanctions (including the defendants' attorney fees) if the court determines
the lawsuit was frivolous.5 For those suits that lead to a settlement, courts
must review attorney fees to ensure that they are "reasonable," potentially
reducing the expected return to plaintiffs' attorneys for any given settle-
ment or judgment amount.6 Greater court scrutiny of both the merits of
the complaint as well as the reasonableness of attorney fees lowers
the expected return to plaintiffs' attorneys from bringing a class action.
Finally, the PSLRA provides for proportionate liability in Rule lOb-5
actions, relieving less culpable parties (such as auditors and outside direc-
tors) of a portion of the total liability.7 This provision may reduce the
funds available for settlement, thus reducing the potential returns from
filing suit.
B. Related Literature
The earliest work in this area focuses on the market's reaction to the PSLRA.
Spiess and Tkac (1997) and Johnson et al. (2000) document that, on
average, the PSLRA was wealth increasing for stockholders. Specifically,
there was a significant negative market reaction to news releases indicating
4See Exchange Act § 21D(b) (3) (B).
5See Exchange Act § 21D(c).
6See Exchange Act § 21D(a) (6).
7Exchange Act § 21D(f).
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that President Clinton would veto the legislation, followed by a significant
positive reaction to the veto override.8 Moreover, the market response is
increasing in firms' overall risk of litigation, but decreasing in the incremen-
tal probability of being sued for fraud (Johnson et al. 2000). Also consistent
with this evidence, Johnson et al. (2000) document a positive market reac-
tion to a related event, a Ninth Circuit decision adopting a stringent inter-
pretation of the PSLRA's pleading standard. The reaction is particularly
strong for firms headquartered in the Ninth Circuit and those at greatest risk
of being sued in a securities class action. Taken together, the evidence
suggests that shareholders viewed the PSLRA's restrictions on securities
litigation as beneficial.
Other research focuses more directly on the effect of the PSLRA on
litigation. Studies describing the frequency of lawsuit filings and the type of
allegations show that lawsuit filings initially declined under the PSLRA, but
subsequently recovered to pre-PSLRA levels (Grundfest & Perino 1997;
PricewaterhouseCoopers 2000; Perino 2003).' In addition, allegations of
accounting irregularities and insider trading increased, while cases based on
allegations of false forecasts decreased.
Pritchard and Sale (2005) study how judges in the Second and Ninth
Circuits apply the PSLRA to resolve motions to dismiss securities fraud
complaints. They find that complaints are significantly more likely to be
dismissed in the Ninth Circuit. Moreover, allegations of insider trading
positively correlate with dismissal in both circuits, but the circuits vary in
their approaches to allegations of accounting violations and false forward-
looking statements. However, the study does not compare the pre- and
post-PSLRA periods. Beatty et al. (2001) find the risk of litigation in connec-
tion with an IPO declined significantly following the enactment of the
PSLRA, but do not provide evidence on the determinants of those filings.
Finally, Bajaj et al. (2003) find that even though settlements increased, on
average, after the passage of the PSLRA, investors recovered a smaller per-
centage of potential losses. The study does not, however, compare system-
'Ali and Kallapur (2001), however, argue that the positive abnormal return at the time of the
PSLRA's enactment is more likely a response to the presidential veto rather than the override,
and thus shareholders considered the PSLRA to be harmful.
9Most of the decline appears to be attributable to plaintiffs shifting venue to state courts to avoid
the PSLRA. However, the Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act was passed on Nov. 3,
1998, effectively closing this loophole.
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atically whether the determinants of those settlements changed with the
adoption of the PSLRA.
Two prior papers relate most directly to our study. Johnson et al.
(2007) (JNP) analyze whether merit-related factors matter more in the post-
PSLRA period. They find that certain indicia of fraud, such as accounting
restatements, are more significant in explaining the incidence and outcome
of suits filed after the PSLRA relative to suits filed before its enactment.
Moreover, forward-looking statements are less significant in explaining the
incidence and outcome of suits post-PSLRA.1 ° JNP does not address the
related question of whether the PSRLA has screened out claims that would
have been deemed meritorious under pre-PSLRA standards. Choi (2007)
examines this question in connection with firms making initial public offer-
ings. He finds that companies engaged in smaller offerings or with a lower
secondary market volume (and therefore reduced potential damages) are
significantly less likely to be the target of a securities class action in the
post-PSLRA period. He also provides evidence that pre-PSLRA nonnuisance
claims lacking obvious hard evidence indicia of fraud (i.e., an accounting
restatement or SEC action) would have faced a lower probability of suit and
a greater likelihood of receiving a dismissal or low-value settlement in the
post-PSLRA period. He posits that the PSLRA caused plaintiffs' attorneys to
shift their attention to the subset of fraud cases where the presence of hard
evidence of fraud made it easier to meet the enhanced pleading require-
ments under the PSLRA, absent discovery.
The sample in Choi (2007) is limited to lawsuits arising out of initial
public offerings. The primary liability exposure for IPO firms, however, is
under the main Securities Act anti-fraud provision, Section 11. Only part of
the PSLRA applies to Securities Act claims. Although plaintiffs must show the
presence of a materially misleading statement or omission, Section 11 does
not require that plaintiffs plead scienter on the part of defendants. Thus, the
central provision of the PSLRA's pleading standard does not apply to Secu-
rities Act claims. Moreover, the safe harbor for forward-looking statements
does not shelter statements made by IPO firms. Therefore, a comprehensive
"°Johnson et al. (2001) examine whether firms changed their disclosure policies in response to
the safe harbor. They find a significant increase in the frequency of firms issuing forecasts and
the number of forecasts issued in the first year following enactment of the PSLRA, and that the
change in disclosure is increasing in firms' ex ante risk of litigation. Although this evidence
suggests that managers believe the safe harbor reduced legal exposure,Johnson et al. (2001) do
not examine the relation between disclosure and litigation in the post-PSLRA period.
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evaluation of the screening effect of the PSLRA requires the study of open-
market fraud claims litigated under Rule 10b-5, which were Congress's prin-
cipal focus in enacting the PSLRA. These claims are also considerably more
common than Section 11 claims.
III. RESEARCH HYPOTHESES
A. Filing of Nuisance Claims
It is widely agreed that the PSLRA has made it more difficult to file a
securities fraud complaint that can withstand a motion to dismiss. Given the
higher bar erected by the PSLRA, we posit that suits resulting in a dismissal
or nuisance settlement before the enactment of the law will be less likely to
be filed post-PSLRA. We label this the nuisance suit effect."
HI: Nuisance Suit Effect. Plaintiffs' attorneys are less likely post-PSLRA to file
suits that would have resulted in dismissal or a low-value settlement pre-PSLRA.
B. Screening of Meritorious Claims
The more stringent standards of the PSLRA may screen out some of the
wheat with the chaff. Accordingly, we test whether some suits that resulted in
a nontrivial settlement prior to the PSLRA will not be filed under the new
regime. We label this the screening effect.
H2 : Screening Effect. Plaintiffs' attorneys are less likely post-PSLRA to file suits
that would have resulted in a high-value settlement pre-PSLRA.
The impact of the PSLRA in raising the costs for pursuing meritorious
actions may not be uniform. Below, we refine our screening effect hypothesis
to consider three factors that are likely to affect the extent to which merito-
rious claims are screened out by the stringent provisions of the PSLRA.
1. Hard Evidence
Some cases will have prefiling hard evidence of fraud, increasing the prob-
ability of recovery and the expected value of filing suit, holding the stakes
available constant. Hard evidence of fraud facilitates the ability of plaintiffs'
"All hypotheses are stated in alternative form.
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attorneys to meet the various PSLRA-imposed requirements, particularly the
heightened pleading requirements at the motion to dismiss stage for Rule
10b-5 actions (i.e., while the discovery stay prevents plaintiffs' attorneys from
gaining access to a company's nonpublic documents).
We define prefiling hard evidence as a public announcement prior to
the lawsuit filing of an accounting restatement (or an inquiry that is
expected to lead to a restatement) or an SEC investigation or enforcement
action. A key element of any securities fraud claim is a material misstatement
or omission. Some of the strongest evidence to satisfy this requirement
available to plaintiffs' lawyers is a violation of generally accepted accounting
principles (GAAP) that results in an earnings restatement. A restatement is
not required unless there has been a material misstatement. Moreover, given
the importance that investors place on earnings in valuing a company's
stock, a restatement of earnings is likely to correlate with large expected
damages.
The existence of an SEC investigation does not establish any element of
the plaintiffs claim, but it does suggest a substantial likelihood of fraud. The
SEC has limited resources, but many instances of fraudulent conduct it can
pursue. One plausible theory of the SEC's enforcement strategy is that the
strength of the available evidence of fraud is one important factor (among
others) guiding the agency's enforcement decisions. The more egregious
the fraud, the easier the case is to prove. On this theory, an SEC enforcement
action signals to plaintiffs' lawyers a high probability of recovery.
Prior to the PSLRA, the discovery process allowed plaintiffs' attorneys
to obtain evidence of the fraud from the defendants to aid in drafting an
adequate complaint. Congress adopted the PSLRA's discovery stay provision
to discourage this "fishing expedition" discovery, but it may also have dis-
couraged meritorious suits for which hard evidence was not publicly avail-
able. The absence of an announcement of an accounting restatement or SEC
investigation prior to the filing of suit does not mean the suit is without
merit. Misstatements unrelated to financial results are equally actionable,
and given that the SEC has finite enforcement resources, many instances of
fraud may escape SEC investigation. Thus, we predict the PSLRA discourages
litigation that would have been deemed nonnuisance under pre-PSLRA
standards, but lacks prefiling hard evidence of fraud.
H3: Screening Effect-Hard Evidence. Plaintiffs' attorneys are less likely post-
PSLRA to file suits that would have resulted in a high-value settlement pre-
PSLRA without prefiling hard evidence of fraud.
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2. Abnormal Insider Trading
Insider trading contemporaneous with alleged fraud can be used to show
that the defendants acted with the requisite scienter to meet the PSLRA's
pleading standard. With certain exceptions, insiders must publicly disclose
their trades in Form 4 filings with the SEC. Thus, insider trading provides an
alternative to prefiling hard evidence for plaintiffs' lawyers seeking to draft a
complaint likely to withstand a motion to dismiss. Insider trading differs
from accounting restatements and SEC investigations, however, because it
offers less clear-cut support for a claim of fraud. Insider sales are quite
common in many industries due to the prevalence of compensation schemes
relying heavily on options. Pritchard and Sale (2005) show that, relative to
other complaints, complaints alleging insider trading are more likely to be
dismissed. This finding suggests that plaintiffs' attorneys have been some-
what scattershot with their allegations of insider trading. The doctrinal
explanation for the higher dismissal rate of insider-trading-based complaints
is that courts hold that insider trading must be unusual in amount or timing
to support an inference that the defendant acted with fraudulent intent.
Thus, we posit that claims lacking evidence of abnormal selling by insiders are
less likely to be filed post-PSLRA if they also lack prefiling hard evidence of
fraud.
H4: Screening Effect-Abnormal Insider Trading. Plaintiffs' attorneys are less likely
post-PSLRA to file suits that would have resulted in a high-value settlement
pre-PSLRA without evidence of abnormal insider trading or hard evidence of
fraud.
3. Earnings Warnings
In enacting the PSLRA, Congress expressed concern that companies failing
to meet earnings expectations were vulnerable to securities fraud class
actions because the inevitable drop in stock price that follows could trigger
a search by plaintiffs' attorneys for a prior optimistic statement that could
now be alleged to be fraudulent. Congress addressed this concern with a
forward-looking safe harbor, which makes it more difficult to bring fraud
claims based on projections. Consequently, courts subject these statements
to more exacting scrutiny than other general allegations of misleading state-
ments or omissions. In effect, Congress raised the standard for what counts
as "meritorious" for a class of claims that legislators suspected had a very low
correlation with fraud. This more stringent definition of merit may have
discouraged plaintiffs' claims based on a failure to meet earnings expecta-
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tions. On the other hand, it costs little to include a forward-looking allega-
tion in a complaint that also includes allegations based on hard evidence of
fraud or abnormal insider trading. JNP present evidence that forecasting
allegations declined only slightly following the PSLRA, but they note a sharp
drop in the incidence of stand-alone forecasting allegations, that is, unac-
companied by an accounting allegation or an insider trading allegation.
H,: Screening Effect-Earnings Warnings. Plaintiffs' attorneys are less likely post-
PSLRA to file suits that would have resulted in a high-value settlement pre-
PSLRA based on a failure to meet earnings forecasts without evidence of
abnormal insider trading or hard evidence of fraud.
C. Outcomes
The filing of claims by plaintiffs' attorneys presumably is informed by their
expectations regarding the outcomes of those cases. Given the barriers
erected by the PSLRA, claims lacking hard evidence or evidence of abnormal
insider trading may be more likely to be dismissed or settled for negligible
amounts. Moreover, suits triggered by earnings warnings lacking hard evi-
dence or abnormal insider trading are also more likely to be dismissed or
settled on the cheap.
H6A: Hard Evidence Outcomes. Suits lacking hard evidence of fraud that received
a nonnuisance outcome pre-PSLRA are more likely to receive a dismissal or
low-value settlement post-PSLRA.
H6B: Abnormal Insider Trading Outcomes. Suits lacking evidence of abnormal
insider trading or hard evidence of fraud that received a nonnuisance outcome
pre-PSLRA are more likely to receive a dismissal or low-value settlement post-
PSLRA.
H6c: Earnings Warning Outcomes. Suits based on warning of a failure to meet
earning forecasts without evidence of abnormal insider trading or hard evidence
of fraud that received a nonnuisance outcome pre-PSLRA are more likely to
receive a dismissal or low-value settlement post-PSLRA.
IV. SAMPLE SELECTION AND DATA
A. Sample
We use the Securities Class Action Alert to identify firms sued in securities
fraud class actions in the pre-PSLRA period (1991-1995), and the Stanford
Securities Class Action Clearinghouse to identify firms sued in the post-
PSLRA period (1996-2000). We exclude lawsuits involving initial public
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offerings, identified from Choi (2007), because they are subject to a different
set of liability rules. FollowingJNP, the first portion of our sample consists of
firms sued in the computer hardware (SIC Codes 3570-3577) and computer
software (SIC Codes 7370-7379) industries. The high-technology sector has
been the most common target for class actions both before and after the
PSLRA, unlike other sectors where the incidence of litigation has fluctuated
over time for reasons unrelated to passage of the PSLRA.'2 To broaden the
generalizability of our findings, however, we include a similar number of
sued firms randomly selected from other (nonfinancial services) industries.
As reported in Table 1, Panel A, our Non-High Technology (High
Technology) lawsuit sample consists of 102 (117) lawsuits for 101 (103)
firms. Some firms appear more than once in our sample because they were
sued more than one time during the sample period. Our sample captures
essentially all the High Technology sued firms, and approximately 6.5
percent of the Non-High Technology sued firms. 13 Panel B of Table 1 reports
the industry distribution for our sample of 219 lawsuits, based on three-digit
SIC codes. Other than the concentration of observations in the high-tech
industry (SIC Codes 357 and 737), no other industry represents more than
5 percent of the sample.
We construct a control sample by matching each lawsuit firm with a
firm from the same industry that was not sued, but that experienced a similar
one-day stock price decline during the sued firm's class period. 4 Losses
suffered by investors are a critical element in determining damages, and thus
a stock price decline is a necessary, but not sufficient, condition for litigation.
Plaintiffs' attorneys use price declines as an initial screen in selecting which
firms to sue. Not all these firms are sued, however, as plaintiffs' attorneys
search for other factors that suggest a lawsuit has sufficient probability of
recovery, such as those discussed in the preceding section. As shown in
12For example, litigation against finance companies declined significantly in the post-PSLRA
period due to the end of the savings and loan crisis and an associated reduction in loan loss
reserve litigation (Grundfest & Perino 1997).
3 To determine the population of 1,561 non-high technology sued firms during our sample
period, we extrapolate the total ntumber of 2000 IPO suits using the average from 1991-1999
based on Choi (2007). We then subtract the total number of IPO suits from 1991-2000 from the
total overall number of suits to determine the population of sued firms.
4For a small number of firms we had difficulty finding matches with all other data items
available. For these firms, we extended the search for a match with a similar price drop up to
three months after the end of the class period.
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Table 1: Sample Information
Panel A: Sample Selection
Non-High Technology High Technology
Number of lawsuits 102 117
Number of sued firms in sample 101 103
Number of sued firms in total 1,561 103
Sample sued firms as percent of total 6.5% 100.0%
Match nonsued firms in sample 102 117
Number of nonsued firms in total 6,468 547
Match nonsued firms as percent of total 1.6% 21.4%
Panel B: Industry Distribution of Sued Firms in the Sample by 3-Digit SIC Code
SIC Code Frequency SIC Code Frequency SIC Code Frequency
131 1 371 3 553 1
152 1 376 1 562 1
203 1 382 2 571 1
211 1 384 8 581 5
221 1 394 2 596 4
225 1 399 1 599 1
232 2 410 1 701 2
273 1 451 1 737 67*
275 1 481 6 738 2
281 1 484 1 781 1
283 11 489 1 799 1
284 2 492 1 802 1
308 1 493 1 806 1
353 2 495 1 808 1
355 1 506 1 809 3
356 1 508 1 873 1
357 50* 509 1 874 1
366 8 513 3
367 1 521 1 Total 219
Panel C: Lawsuit Filings and Allegations
Allegations
Filing Year Number Accounting Insider Trading Forecast
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
Pre-PSLRA total
6 (35.3%)
7 (36.8%)
6 (42.9%)
7 (30.4%)
6 (31.6%)
32 (34.8%)
4 (25.0%)
5 (26.3%)
3 (21.4%)
9 (39.1%)
5 (26.3%)
26 (28.6%)
12 (70.6%)
15 (79.0%)
12 (85.7%)
17 (73.9%)
13 (68.4%)
69 (75.0%)
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Table 1: Continued
Allegations
Filing Year Number Accounting hisider Trading Forecast
1996 12 7 (58.3%) 10 (83.3%) 5 (41.7%)
1997 25 12 (48.0%) 16 (64.0%) 17 (68.0%)
1998 32 20 (64.5%) 17 (54.8%) 17 (54.8%)
1999 29 15 (51.7%) 20 (69.0%) 20 (69.0%)
2000 23 11 (50.0%) 13 (59.0%) 14 (63.6%)
Post-PSLRA total 121 65 (54.6%) 76 (63.9%) 73 (61.3%)
Total 219 97 (46.0%) 102 (48.6%) 142 (67.3%)
Panel D: Lawsuit Outcomes
Outcome Pre-PSLRA Post-PSLRA
Frequency
Dismissed 21 (21.4%) 37 (30.6%)
Settled (in $ millions)
<$2 15 (15.3%) 13 (10.7%)
$2 to <$5 19 (19.4%) 23 (19.0%)
$5 to <$10 20 (20.4%) 20 (16.5%)
>$1 0 20 (20.4%) 27 (22.3%)
Trial verdict for defendants 3 (3.1%) 0 (0.0%)
Undisclosed 0 (0.0%) 1 (0.9%)
Total 98 (100.0%) 121 (100.0%)
Amount (in $ millions)
Mean (including dismissals) 11.26 (8.50) 19.00 (13.14)
Median (including dismissals) 5.76 (3.20) 5.59 (3.38)
Maximum 123.08 251.83
*Indicates High Tech sample SIC codes in Panel B. Settlement amounts in Panel D are adjusted
for inflation to year 2000 dollars.
Table 1, Panel A, the control sample of nonsued firms for the Non-High
Tech (High Tech) sample comprises 1.6 percent (21.4 percent) of the
population available on CRSP.15
B. Data
We use data from a variety of sources, including the Securities Class Action
Alert, Stanford Securities Class Clearinghouse, disclosures in firms' periodic
1
51n the next section of the article, we discuss research design issues related to die unbalanced
representation of the sued and nonsued firms in the sample.
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SEC filings, discussions of cases in judicial opinions, websites of various
claims administrators, and information provided by PricewaterhouseCoo-
pers, to identify the date the lawsuit was filed, the class period, and the
lawsuit outcome. We obtain market and accounting data from the CRSP and
Compustat tapes. We search Lexis and periodic SEC filings to identify
accounting restatements and voluntary management earnings forecasts. We
obtain insider trading data from Thomson Financial. Finally, we collect by
hand information regarding corporate governance structure from sample
firms' last proxy statement prior to the beginning of the class period, if
available, or, if not, the first available proxy after the beginning of the class
period.
C. Descriptive Statistics
As shown in Table 1, Panel C, 98 sample firms were sued pre-PSLRA and 121
post-PSLRA. Consistent with JNP, the proportion of lawsuits alleging
accounting fraud and insider trading rises sharply after the PSLRA, while the
percentage of suits alleging false forecasts declines, although not as precipi-
tously. These trends are consistent with plaintiffs' lawyers relying more on
objective evidence to support their claims of fraud and the forward-looking
safe harbor discouraging the filing of allegations based on forecasts. Table 1,
Panel D summarizes the outcomes of the lawsuits. The frequency of dismiss-
als increased from 20 percent pre-PSLRA to nearly 31 percent post-PSLRA.
Mean settlement values are nearly double post-PSLRA, although this trend
appears to be driven by a few large settlements, as the median is essentially
unchanged from the pre-PSLRA period. 6
In Table 2, we provide descriptive statistics comparing the variables
used in our analysis for the pre- and post-PSLRA periods. 7 To investigate the
association between a screening effect and hard evidence of fraud, we con-
sider firms with either an earnings restatement or an SEC investigation.
Further, we distinguish between hard evidence that is publicly available prior
to the filing of the complaint and that which is not. The findings indicate
that both RESTATEMENT and PREFILING RESTATEMENT are significantly
greater in the post-PSLRA period while there is no evidence of a significant
6 All settlement amounts reported in the article have been adjusted for inflation to year 2000
dollars.
'
7 A11 variables are defined in the Appendix.
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change in the frequency of SEC investigations. Considering both types of
hard evidence together reveals that HARD EVIDENCE and PREFILING HARD
EVIDENCE are significantly greater in the post-PSLRA period.
Insider trading activity can serve as alternative support to prefiling hard
evidence for plaintiffs' lawyers drafting a securities fraud complaint. Follow-
ingJNP, we measure abnormal insider trading as the difference between the
net amount of shares traded (in millions) by directors and officers during
the class period and the net amount of shares traded by directors and officers
during an equal number of days preceding the start of the class period. A
negative (positive) value indicates abnormal net sales (purchases). We find
that ABNORMAL INSIDER TRADING is significantly more negative in the post-
PSLRA period, indicating an increase in unusual sales activity.
A voluntary warning of bad earnings news (EARNINGS WARNING) can
cause a sudden stock price drop that attracts the attention of the plaintiffs'
bar, but is unlikely to survive as a stand-alone basis for complaint in the
post-PSLRA period. We distinguish an earnings warning on either the last
day of the class period or the day with the most negative stock return from a
NEGATIVE FORECAST issued at any other point during the class period that
might serve to manage expectations downward and reduce litigation expo-
sure.' 8 Conversely, a POSITIVE FORECAST could leave the firm vulnerable to
litigation if the projections are not realized. Table 2 reveals that none of the
voluntary disclosure variables are significantly different between the two
periods.
In addition to the above factors we hypothesize are associated with a
screening effect, we control for several other variables that may play a role in
securities litigation. Specifically, following JNP, our analysis includes the
average tenure of outside members of the board (AVG. TENURE), the average
number of other directorships held by outside directors (BUSY), the percent-
age of outside directors (INDEPENDENT), the number of meetings held by the
firm's audit committee (AUDIT MEETINGS), and the percentage of indepen-
dent directors on the audit committee (INDEPENDENT AUDIT). Only one of
the governance variables, INDEPENDENT AUDIT, is significantly different
between the pre- and post-PSLRA periods, with audit committees more
independent after the PSLRA.
"
5 Our definition of the class period includes one trading day following the end of the class
period specified in the lawsuit. This is because the revelation of potential fraud that triggers the
suit may occur after the market closed, resulting in a negative market reaction the following
trading day.
52 Choi et al.
Finally, prior research indicates that market value of equity (MARKET
CAP.) and share turnover (TURNOVER) and the magnitude of the minimum
one-day class period return (MIN. RETURN) are positively associated with the
incidence of lawsuits (e.g., Francis et al. 1994; Jones & Weingram 1996;
JNP).' The results in Table 2 reveal no significant difference in firm size
between the pre- and post-PSLRA periods. However, share turnover is sig-
nificantly higher and the minimum one-day return is significantly more
negative in the post-PSLRA period.
Table 3 compares the lawsuit firms with the control sample of nonsued
firms. In the pre-PSLRA period (Panel A), lawsuits firms are significantly
more likely to have a restatement or an SEC investigation, but the difference
is not significant for the subset of restatements or investigations publicly
available prior to lawsuit filing. In contrast, in the post-PSLRA period (Panel
B), not only do the sued firms have more restatements and SEC investiga-
tions, but the differences are significant both overall and for the subset of
announcements available prior to lawsuit filing. A similar pattern is evident
for abnormal insider trading. ABNORMAL INSIDER TRADING is significantly
more negative for lawsuit firms only in the post-PSLRA period. In contrast,
sued firms are significantly more likely to issue an earnings warning or a
positive forecast in both the pre- and post-PSLRA periods.
Findings for the governance variables reveal no significant differences
between the sued and control firms in the pre-PSLRA period. Post-PSLRA,
however, sued firms have busier directors, as expected, but also, unexpect-
edly, more independent boards and audit committees and those audit com-
mittees meet more frequently. Overall, these differences suggest that the
sued firms may recognize they are in need of more intensive monitoring, but
that this monitoring is not sufficient to protect them from suit. The gover-
nance variables, however, correlate fairly highly with firm size, so these
differences may simply reflect the preference of plaintiffs' lawyers to sue
larger firms. Finally, as predicted, our three measures relating to damages,
MARKET CAP., TURNOVER, and MIN. RETURN, are significantly greater for sued
firms in both periods.
We provide a comparison of the High Technology and Non-High
Technology lawsuit firms in Table 4. The two subsamples are similar along
most dimensions. However, High Technology firms are significantly more
'For most of the sued firms, the minimum return occurs on the day the bad news giving rise to
the lawsuit is revealed, which is typically the last day of the class period or the day after.
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likely to have a PREFILING RESTATEMENT and to issue an EARNINGS WARNING
or a POSITIVE FORECAST. In addition, there are some significant differences
in governance structures. Specifically, High Technology firms have a greater
percentage of INDEPENDENT directors, but those directors also hold more
other directorships. In addition, audit committees of High Technology firms
hold more meetings and have a higher percentage of outside directors.
V. RESULTS
A. Screening of Lawsuit Filings
In this section, we provide evidence on whether the PSLRA has excluded
cases that would have been brought under the pre-PSLRA regime. Because
Congress explicitly intended to discourage "nuisance" litigation, we expect
to find at least some cases excluded if the PSLRA is working as intended. Our
first hypothesis tests for this nuisance suit effect. Congress claimed, however,
that it did not want to discourage "meritorious" litigation in enacting the
PSLRA. Our remaining hypotheses examine various dimensions of this
screening effect. Screening frivolous litigation without discouraging merito-
rious litigation would be an ideal outcome, the policy equivalent of a free
lunch.
It is not possible to identify directly the suits eliminated by the PSLRA;
cases not brought leave no paper trail. Instead, we investigate the extent to
which the PSLRA filters litigation that would have been deemed frivolous
pre-PSLRA, or discourages litigation that would have been deemed merito-
rious pre-PSLRA. This inquiry requires a definition of merit. FollowingJNP,
we consider settlements that exceed 0.5 percent of market capitalization 10
days before the end of the class period to be nonnuisance suits. To test
whether certain types of lawsuits are less likely to be filed post-PSLRA, we
estimate how such suits actually filed in the pre-PSLRA period would have
fared in the post-PSLRA period using the following methodology.
1. Estimate a logit model for the decision to file suit in the post-PSLRA
period.
2. Use the results from the estimated logit model in Step 1 to generate
predicted probabilities of filing in the post-PSLRA period for certain
types of firms (and their corresponding matches) drawn from the
pre-PSLRA sample.
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Table 5: Factors Associated with Lawsuit Filings
Post-PSLRA
Variable Prediction Coefficient p Value
Constant ? -6.44 0.00
Prefiling hard evidence + 2.37 0.00
Abnormal insider trading - -1.01 0.16
Earnings warning + 1.04 0.01
Positive forecast + 0.45 0.16
Negative forecast - -0.32 0.44
Avg. tenure - -0.05 0.26
Busy + -0.05 0.82
Independent -0.92 0.37
Audit meetings - -0.16 0.35
Independent audit - 0.74 0.19
Market cap. + 0.72 0.00
Turnover + 2.02 0.00
Min. return - -4.05 0.00
HiTech ? -0.54 0.12
Pseudo R' 0.44
N 229
NorE: Variable definitions are in the Appendix. The results
are for a logistic regression estimated for the post-PSLRA
period. Errors are clustered by three-digit SIC code. All p values
are two-sided.
3. Test the null hypothesis that the actual probability of filing in the
pre-PSLRA period is the same as the predicted probability of filing
in the post-PSLRA period.
Table 5 presents the results of the lawsuit prediction model for the post-
PSLRA period (Step 1 in the above methodology). Errors are clustered by
three-digit SIC code. Because of missing data, the estimation includes 229 of
the 242 post-PSLRA observations. The model correctly classifies 82.1 percent
of the sample observations.
2°
As expected, and consistent with JNP, PREFILING HARD EVIDENCE and
EARNINGS WARNING are significant determinants of post-PSLRA lawsuit
filings. ABNORMAL INSIDER TRADING has the predicted negative sign, but is
'Specifically, 14.5 percent of the sued firms were classified by the model as having less than a
50 percent probability of suit, while 21.4 percent of the control firms were classified by the
model as having a greater than or equal to 50 percent probability of suit. Overall, the model
correctly classifies over 80 percent of the sample, mitigating concerns that estimation error in
the litigation prediction model affects inferences in our primary tests.
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Table 6: Tests of Screening Effect and Nuisance Suit Effect for
Lawsuit Filings
Actual Fraction Predicted Fraction
N Pre-PSLA Post-PSLRA p Value
Panel A: Nuisance Suit Effect(HI) and Screening Effect (H2)
Nuisance suits 80 0.50 0.41 0.27
Nonnuisance suits 112 0.51 0.36 0.03
Panel B: Screening Effect-Hard Evidence (H3)
No prefiling hard evidence 104 0.48 0.33 0.03
Prefiling hard evidence 8 0.88 0.73 0.52
Panel C: Screening Effect-Abnormal Insider Trading (H4)
No prefiling hard evidence and no 88 0.50 0.33 0.02
abnormal insider trading
Prefiling hard evidence or abnormal 24 0.54 0.49 0.77
insider trading
Panel D: Screening Effect-Earnings Warnings (H5)
Earnings warning 36 0.78 0.61 0.13
Earnings warning and no prefiling hard 23 0.87 0.63 0.08
evidence and no abnormal insider
trading
NOTE: The predicted fraction of lawsuit filings is based on estimation of the logistic regression
model reported in Table 5. A lawsuit is classified as nonnuisance if the settlement amount is
greater than 0.5 percent of the firm's market value 10 days prior to the end of the class period.
p value is for a X2 test of the difference between the 2 x 2 classification based on (1) the number
of sued versus nonsued firms and (2) the actual pre-PSLRA and predicted post-PSLRA fractions.
not significant at conventional levels. Coefficient estimates on POSITIVE
FORECAST and NEGATIVE FORECAST are insignificant, as are those on the
governance variables. All three of the damages variables, TURNOVER, MARKET
CAP., and ABNORMAL MIN. RETURN, are significant in the predicted direction.
Finally, HITECH is negative and insignificant, indicating that conditional on
other lawsuit determinants, high-technology firms are no more likely to be
sued than other firms.
Table 6 presents the results of statistical tests comparing the actual
fraction of certain types of lawsuits in the pre-PSLRA period with the fraction
the post-PSRLA litigation model predicts would be sued (Steps 2 and 3 in the
above methodology)." Somewhat surprisingly, the findings in Panel A do
21The actual fraction is determined using the matched lawsuit-control sample. Thus, for com-
parability, the predicted fraction is determined using the unweighted logit estimation of the
lawsuit prediction model reported in Table 5. As noted earlier, the sample contains a higher
proportion of sued than nonsued firms. Calculating the predicted fraction based on a weighted
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not support a nuisance suit effect as predicted in Hypothesis 1. The actual
fraction of nuisance suits is 50 percent pre-PSLRA. Although our prediction
model suggests that only 41 percent of these suits would have been filed
under the PSLRA regime, the difference is not significant. These nuisance
suits, of course, are the ones that Congress sought to deter by adopting the
PSRLA. We do find, however, evidence of a screening effect, consistent with
Hypothesis 2. Specifically, the actual fraction of nonnuisance suits is 51
percent in the pre-PSLRA period while our prediction model suggests that
only 36 percent of these firms would have been sued under the post-PSLRA
regime, significant at the 0.03 level. Thus, the PSLRA is screening out claims
with some indicia of merit, not just claims that would have been deemed
frivolous nuisance suits under the prior rules.
The remaining panels in Table 6 investigate which types of nonnui-
sance claims are being screened by the PSLRA. Panel B provides evidence
supporting the hard evidence hypothesis (Hypothesis 3). Of the sample of
112 nonnuisance firms in the pre-PSLRA period, 104 lacked prefiling hard
evidence of fraud; nonetheless, 48 percent were sued. Applying the PSLRA
prediction model, however, only 33 percent of these firms would have been
sued under the post-PSLRA regime. Thus, a significant fraction of nonnui-
sance suits lacking prefiling hard evidence of fraud filed in the pre-PSLRA
period would not have been filed in the post-PSLRA period. In contrast, we
find no significant difference between the actual and predicted incidence of
suits with prefiling hard evidence of fraud, although this finding should be
interpreted cautiously because of the small number of observations (eight)
in this analysis. Taken together, the results in Panel B suggest that plaintiffs'
lawyers require more objective evidence of fraud before they are willing to
file suit under the more rigorous standards of the PSLRA.
Panel C of Table 6 shows the screening effect persists if we consider
nonnuisance firms with either abnormal insider trading or prefiling hard
evidence of fraud, consistent with Hypothesis 4. Of the 88 firms in the
nonnuisance sample that lacked prefiling hard evidence and abnormal
logit estimation, however, will naturally produce a much lower fraction, presenting an invalid
comparison of the pre- and post-PSLRA periods and biasing in favor of rejecting the null
hypothesis. In untabulated sensitivity analysis, we find that estimating a weighted logit model of
the lawsuit prediction model, where we weight each observation by the inverse of the probability
of its inclusion in the sample, as reported in Table 1, Panel A, yields qualitatively similar results.
We also estimate an unweighted conditional logit model, as in JNP, with no change in infer-
ences. Conditional logistic regression explicitly controls for the matched-pair nature of the data
and corrects for possible correlated omitted variables bias due to the matching procedure.
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insider trading, our model predicts that only 33 percent would have been
sued under the PSLRA regime, compared to the 50 percent actually sued in
the pre-PSLRA regime. This difference is significant at the 0.02 level. The
predicted incidence of lawsuit filing for firms with either prefiling hard
evidence or abnormal insider trading is also lower than the actual incidence,
but this difference is insignificant (p value = 0.77).
Finally, the results in Table 6 also support the earnings warning
hypothesis (Hypothesis 5). Specifically, Panel D shows a significantly
reduced probability of a suit for nonnuisance claims based on an earnings
warning in the absence of prefiling hard evidence or abnormal insider
trading. Of the 23 firms in our nonnuisance sample that issued an earnings
warning without such evidence, 87 percent were sued in the pre-PSLRA
period. This compares to a predicted incidence of 63 percent in the post-
PSLRA period, a difference that is significant at the 0.08 level. There is also
a reduced probability of a suit for nonnuisance claims based on an earnings
warning regardless of prefiling hard evidence, but this difference is not
significant at conventional levels (p value = 0.13).
Taken together, the results reported in Table 6 provide evidence con-
sistent with the PSLRA screening out litigation that would have been deemed
meritorious under the pre-PSLRA standards.22 It is possible, however, that we
have set the definition of nonnuisance settlements too low. For example, if
we underestimated defense and distraction costs, the nonnuisance threshold
of 0.5 percent of market value would be higher. As a sensitivity check, we
replicate the analysis in Table 6 using a series of increasingly higher cutoffs
for the nonnuisance threshold. The results are presented in Table 7 for the
Abnormal Insider Trading Hypothesis (Hypothesis 4). We find a lower pre-
dicted incidence of litigation under the PSLRA for firms lacking prefiling
hard evidence and abnormal insider trading up to a nonnuisance threshold
of 4.0 percent of market value. Thus, our conclusion that the PSLRA screens
out suits that would have been deemed meritorious under the pre-PSLRA
regime appears to be robust to the definition of nonnuisance suits.23
221n addition to comparing the actual fraction of certain types of lawsuits in the pre-PSLRA
period with the predicted post-PSLRA fraction, we compare the predictions generated by a
pre-PSLRA model with the predicted post-PSLRA fraction. Inferences from this untabulated
analysis are similar to those in Table 6.
23As a further robustness check, we use an alternative definition of nonnuisance, specifically
suits that result in a settlement of over $2 million. Grundfest (1995:742-43) adopts the rule of
thumb that settlements for less than a cutoff ranging from $1.5 to $2.5 million are nuisance in
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Table 7: Tests of Robustness of Screening Effect-Abnormal Insider
Trading Hypothesis
Nonnuisance Actual Fraction Predicted Fraction
Threshold (%) N Pre-PSLRA Post-PSLRA p Value
0.5% 88 0.50 0.33 0.02
1.0 80 0.48 0.29 0.02
>1.5 61 0.51 0.29 0.01
2.0 45 0.53 0.29 0.02
-2.5 42 0.55 0.31 0.03
3.0 35 0.54 0.29 0.03
t3.5 27 0.56 0.26 0.03
--4.0 23 0.57 0.24 0.04
NOTE: The actual and predicted fraction of suits is determined in the following steps: (1) the
pool of pre-PSLRA suit firms that satisfy the specified nonnuisance threshold, calculated as
the settlement amount as a percentage of the firm's market value 10 days prior to the end of the
class period, are selected along with their corresponding matched firms; (2) only those suit and
match firms in the pool that have no prefiling hard evidence and no abnormal insider trading
are identified; (3) the actual fraction of pre-PSLRA suits is equal to the fraction of firms that
faced a suit in the sample derived from Step (2); (4) the predicted fraction of post-PSLRA suits
is equal to the mean probability of suit for the sample derived from Step (2) applying the logistic
regression model from Table 5. p value is for a X' test of the difference between the 2 x 2
classification based on (1) the number of sued versus nonsued firms and (2) the actual
pre-PSLRA and predicted post-PSLRA fractions.
B. Lawsuit Outcomes
One explanation for the reluctance of plaintiffs' attorneys to pursue non-
nuisance litigation post-PSLRA absent prefiling hard evidence or abnormal
insider trading is a possible shift in the expected outcomes of suits. Recall
that Table 1, Panel D reported a higher likelihood of dismissal for suits filed
post-PSLRA. To assess whether the PSLRA has a screening effect on out-
comes as well as on filings, we repeat the screening analysis presented in
the sense that "the merits may not have mattered at all in the resolution of the litigation."
Although settlements tinder $2 million likely include both nuisance and nonnuisance suits
(some of which may have settled for small amounts because the defendants lacked assets and
insurance coverage), settlements over $2 million are likely to have some merit. To the extent
defendants settle nuisance suits to avoid defense costs as well as possible distraction on man-
agement and negative publicity, the maximum amount for which defendants will settle a
nuisance claim typically will not exceed $2 million. Consistent with our main results, we find the
predicted incidence of litigation is significantly lower using a $2 million cutoff, and continues
to be lower tip to a cutoff of $6 million, a relatively generous definition of defense costs. Because
the results from this analysis are substantially similar to the results using the settlement to
market capitalization ratio, we do not tabulate them.
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Table 6 using a post-PSLRA outcome model to predict the likelihood of a
nonnuisance outcome for the pre-PSLRA suits if they were subject to the
PSRLA regime. For this analysis, we classify a lawsuit as a dismissal if it was
resolved in the company's favor. Thus, dismissals include lawsuits that were
dismissed or settled for a small fraction of the firm's market value. As above,
we consider these "nuisance" settlements, defined as a settlement of less than
0.5 percent of a firm's market value 10 days before the end of the class
period, as tantamount to a dismissal.24
The post-PSLRA settlements model has a number of differences from
the filing model above. Because we are concerned with the likelihood of
recovery rather than the amount of recovery, we omit the damages-related
variables (MARKET CAP., TURNOVER, and MIN. RETURN). We also omit the
governance variables as only secondary indicators of potential fraud, and the
high-technology indicator variable, which should not influence the lawsuit
outcome. In addition, we substitute HARD EVIDENCE for PREFILING HARD
EVIDENCE. HARD EVIDENCE includes not only PREFILING HARD EVIDENCE, but
also public restatements and announcements of an SEC investigation or
enforcement action related to the litigation that occurs anytime after the
filing of suit up to the outcome date of the litigation. The occurrence of a
restatement or SEC investigation even after the filing of suit may pressure
defendants into a more generous settlement. Finally, we include an indicator
variable, HIGH VOLUME COURT, which may negatively correlate with likeli-
hood of success. Courts in districts with a substantial number of securities
fraud class actions, such as the Southern District of New York or a district
court in any of the California districts, may be more skeptical of such claims
(Grundfest & Pritchard 2002).
We report the results of this regression in Table 8. We find that HARD
EVIDENCE correlates positively and significantly with a nonnuisance settle-
ment post-PSRLA. The coefficient estimate on ABNORMAL INSIDER TRADING,
however, is insignificant (pvalue = 0.37). The voluntary forecast variables are
generally insignificant, with the exception of POSITIVE FORECAST, which is
positive and significant. The coefficient estimate on HIGH VOLUME COURT is
significant, but the sign is the opposite from the predicted direction.
"
4FollowingJNP, we do not estimate a linear model using the actual settlement amount as the
dependent variable due to the lack of data on directors and officers' insurance coverage, which
is an important determinant of the actual settlement amount.
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Table 8: Factors Associated with Dismissed
Post-PSLRA
Versus Settled Lawsuits
Variable Prediction Coefficient p Value
Constant ? 0.62 0.19
Hard evidence + 1.14 0.02
Abnormal insider trading - -0.27 0.37
Earnings warning ? -0.16 0.50
Positive forecast ? 0.74 0.02
Negative forecast ? -0.51 0.15
High volume court 0.72 0.03
Log likelihood -199.87
Wald X2  15.3
N 230
Censored N 114
Uncensored N 116
NOTE: Variable definitions are in the Appendix. The reported results are for the second stage
of a two-stage Heckman model estimated for the post-PSLRA period. Stage 2 is a probit model
where the dependent variable is equal to I for settlements greater than 0.5 percent of the firm's
market value 10 days prior to the end of the class period. Stage 1 (unreported) is a probit model
for the decision to file suit:
Prob(suit) = f(Turnover, Min. Return, HiTech, Avg. Tenure, Busy, Independent, Audit Meet-
ings, Independent Audit).
Errors are clustered by three-digit SIC code. All p values are two-sided.
To test for a screening effect for lawsuit outcomes, we follow a similar
procedure as outlined above to test for the screening of lawsuit filings.
Specifically, we use the results from the settlements model estimated in
Table 8 to generate predicted probabilities of settlement, which we then
compare to the actual probability of settlement in the pre-PSLRA period.
The results of this analysis, presented in Table 9, show only limited evidence
of a screening effect with respect to settlements. Panel A shows that the
actual incidence of nonnuisance outcomes is 59 percent for the pre-PSRLA
suits, whereas the predicted incidence under the post-PSRLA outcome
model is 47 percent, an insignificant difference. Moreover, we do not find a
significant difference when we examine cases without HARD EVIDENCE (Panel
B) or suits based on an EARNINGS WARNING (Panel D). We do, however, find
evidence of a screening effect for outcomes when we focus on cases that lack
HARD EVIDENCE and ABNORMAL INSIDER TRADING. Specifically, Panel C shows
a significantly reduced probability of a nonnuisance outcome, from 56
percent of actual pre-PSLRA suits to 39 percent predicted under the post-
PSLRA regime (p value = 0.07).
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Table 9: Tests of Screening Effect for Lawsuit Outcomes
Actual Fraction Predicted Fraction
N Pre-PSLRA Post-PSLRA p Value
Panel A: Screening Effect
Nonnuisance suits 97 0.59 0.47 0.42
Panel B: Hard Evidence Outcomes (H6A)
No hard evidence 78 0.51 0.40 0.15
Hard evidence 19 0.90 0.77 0.37
Panel C: Abnormal Insider Trading Outcomes (H6B)
No hard evidence and no abnormal 63 0.56 0.39 0.07
insider trading
Hard evidence or abnormal insider 34 0.65 0.61 0.80
trading
Panel D: Earnings Warnings Outcomes (H6C)
Earnings warning 56 0.50 0.41 0.34
Earnings warning and no hard 35 0.49 0.37 0.33
evidence and no abnormal
insider trading
NorE: The predicted fraction of nonnuisance outcomes is based on the regression model
reported in Table 8. A lawsuit is classified as nonnuisance if the settlement amount is greater
than 0.5 percent of the firm's market value 10 days prior to the end of the class period. p value
is for a X' test of the difference between the 2 x 2 classification based on (1) the number of sued
versus nonsued firms and (2) the acttal pre-PSLRA and predicted post-PSLRA fractions.
As with the filing analysis, we replicate the analysis in Table 9 using a
series of increasingly higher cutoffs for the nonnuisance threshold. The
results are presented in Table 10 for the Abnormal Insider Trading Out-
comes Hypothesis. We find a significantly lower probability of a nonnui-
sance settlement under the PSLRA only up to a threshold of 1.0 percent of
market capitalization. We conclude that our finding of a screening effect
for case outcomes is reasonably robust to alternative specifications of a
nonnuisance suit, but not as robust as the screening effect for lawsuit
filings. Our settlements analysis is arguably handicapped by the unavailabil-
ity of data with regard to the evidence that the plaintiffs may have obtained
through the discovery process, which would certainly have an impact on
settlement negotiations.
VI. CONCLUSION
This article documents the existence of a screening effect stemming from
the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act; many suits that would have been
Screening Effect of Private Securities Litigation Reform Act
Table 10: Tests of Robustness of Screening Effect-Abnormal Insider
Trading Outcomes Hypothesis
Nonnuisance Actual Fraction Predicted Fraction
Threshold (%) N Pre-PSLRA Post-PSLRA p Value
>-0.5% 63 0.56 0.39 0.07
1.0 63 0.46 0.31 0.07
>1.5 63 0.37 0.24 0.12
>2.0 63 0.27 0.19 0.29
>2.5 63 0.25 0.16 0.19
>3.0 63 0.19 0.15 0.64
>3.5 63 0.13 0.16 0.61
>4.0 63 0.11 0.10 0.77
NOTE: The predicted fraction of nonnuisance outcomes is based on the regression model
reported in Table 8. A lawsuit is classified as nonnuisance if the settlement amount as a
percentage of the firm's market value 10 days prior to the end of the class period is greater than
the specified nonnuisance threshold. The actual fraction of pre-PSLRA suits is equal to the
fraction of firms with an outcome above the nonnuisance threshold. p value is for ax test of the
difference between the 2 x 2 classification based on (1) the number of sued versus nonsued
firms and (2) the actual pre-PSLRA and predicted post-PSLRA fractions.
deemed nonnuisance prior to the PSLRA likely would not be filed after
Congress adopted the PSLRA. We find only limited evidence, however, with
respect to the likelihood of a nonnuisance outcome after passage of the
PSLRA. The evidence thus suggests the PSLRA has a much stronger effect
on the likelihood of filing suit than it does on the outcomes of suits that
are filed.
We do not find evidence of a significant filtering effect for suits that
settled for nuisance value or were dismissed pre-PSLRA; thus, we cannot
reject the hypothesis that those cases would still be filed post-PSLRA. Overall,
our findings do not show that Congress's efforts to discourage frivolous
litigation have succeeded; indeed, we find stronger evidence that the PSRLA
has succeeded in discouraging securities fraud class actions that would likely
have been deemed meritorious prior to the PSLRA. Reducing the incidence
of such class actions could come at the price of reduced deterrence. Our
finding of a screening effect at the filing stage cannot tell us whether the
benefits to companies of reduced exposure to litigation outweigh any dimi-
nution in deterrence. To answer that question would require a measure of
the marginal deterrence provided by securities fraud class actions; finding
such a measure is an important task for future research on the effects of
securities fraud class actions.
Based on our findings, we conclude that Congress effectively elevated
the definition of merit in adopting the largely procedural requirements of
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the PSLRA. Substance and procedure are inextricably intertwined. Assessing
whether Congress has set the level of "merit" too high or too low cannot be
answered within the framework of this study. It may be that the suits discour-
aged by the adoption of the PSLRA, although sufficient to generate nonnui-
sance settlements under the pre-PSLRA standards, have added little to the
deterrent effect provided by securities fraud class actions. Currently available
econometric methods cannot tell us whether this tradeoff was worth it, but
they can help show that the tradeoff is real.
REFERENCES
Ali, A., & S. Kallapur (2001) "Securities Price Consequences of the Private Securities
Litigation Reform Act of 1995 and Related Events," 76 Accounting Rev. 431.
Bajaj, M., S. C. Mazumdar, & A. Sarin (2003) "Securities Class Action Settlements: An
Empirical Analysis," 43 Santa Clara Law Rev. 1001.
Beatty, R. P., P. P. Drake, & C. E. Hogan (2001) "The Impact of the 1995 Private
Securities Litigation Reform Act on Litigation Risk and Auditor Compensa-
tion in the IPO Market," unpublished manuscript. University of Southern
California.
Choi, S. J. (2007) "Do the Merits Matter Less After the Private Securities Litigation
Reform Act?" 23 J of Law, Economics & Organization 598.
Foster, T. S., D. N. Martin, V. M.Juneja, & F. C. Dunbar (2000) "Trends in Securities
Litigation and the Impact of the PSLRA," unpublished manuscript. National
Economic Research Associates.
Foster, T. S., R. I. Miller, S. Plancich, B. Saxton, & S. Starykb (2007) "Recent Trends
in Shareholder Class Action Litigation: Filings Stay Low and Average Settle-
ments Stay High-But are These Trends Reversing?" unpublished manuscript.
National Economic Research Associates.
Francis,J, D. Philbrick, & K. Schipper (1994) "Shareholder Litigation and Corporate
Disclosures," 32 J of Accounting Research 137.
Grundfest, J. (1995) "Why Disimply?" 108 Harvard Law Rev. 727.
Grundfest, J., & M. Perino (1997) "Securities Litigation Reform: The First Year's
Experience," unpublished manuscript. Stanford University.
Grundfest, J. A., & A. C. Pritchard (2002) "Statutes with Multiple Personality Disor-
ders: The Value of Ambiguity in Statutory Design and Interpretation," 54
Stanford Law Rev. 627.
H.R. Rep. No. 104-50, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995).
Johnson, M. F., R. Kasznik, & K. K. Nelson (2000) "Shareholder Wealth Effects of the
Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995," 5 Rev. of Accounting Studies
217.
- (2001) "The Impact of Securities Litigation Reform on the Disclosure of
Forward-Looking Information by High Technology Firms," 39 J of Accounting
Research 297.
Screening Effect of Private Securities Litigation Reform Act
Johnson, M. F., K. K. Nelson, & A. C. Pritchard (2000) "In re Silicon Graphics, Inc.:
Shareholder Wealth Effects Resulting from the Interpretation of the Private
Securities Litigation Reform Act's Pleading Standard," 73 Southern California
Law Rev. 773.
- (2007) "Do the Merits Matter More? The Impact of the Private Securities
Litigation Reform Act," 23J. of Law, Economics & Organization 627.
Jones, C. L., & S. E. Weingram (1996) "The Determinants of 10b-5 Litigation Risk,"
unpublished manuscript. Stanford Law School.
Nelson, K. K., & A. C. Pritchard (2007) "Litigation Risk and Voluntary Disclosure:
The Use of Meaningful Cautionary Language," working paper. Rice University.
Perino, M. A. (2003) "Did the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act Work?"
University of Illinois Law Rev. 913.
PricewaterhouseCoopers (2000) 2000 Securities Litigation Study. Available at
www.10b5.com.
Pritchard, A. C. (1999) "Markets as Monitors: A Proposal to Replace Class Actions
with Exchanges as Securities Fraud Monitors," 85 Virginia Law Rev. 925.
Pritchard, A. C., & H. A. Sale (2005) "What Counts as Fraud? An Empirical Study of
Motions to Dismiss Under the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act," 2J. of
Empirical Legal Studies 125.
Private Securities Litigation Reform Act, 109 Stat. 737 (1995) (codified as amended
in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.).
Spiess, D. K., & P. Tkac (1997) "The Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995:
The Stock Market Casts its Vote," 18 Managerial & Decision Economics 545.
S. Rep. No. 104-98, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995).
APPENDIX: VARIABLE DEFINITIONS
Variable
Restatement
Prefiling restatement
SEC investigation
Prefiling SEC investigation
Hard evidence
Prefiling hard evidence
Description
Indicator variable equal to I if the firm restated class period
earnings; 0 otherwise
Indicator variable equal to 1 if the firm restated class period
earnings before the filing of the complaint; 0 otherwise
Indicator variable equal to 1 if the firm was investigated by
the SEC for conduct during the class period; 0 otherwise
Indicator variable equal to 1 if the firm was investigated by
the SEC for conduct during the class period before the
filing of the complaint; 0 otherwise
Indicator variable equal to 1 if the firm restated class period
earnings or was investigated by the SEC for conduct
during the class period; 0 otherwise
Indicator variable equal to I if the firm restated class period
earnings or was investigated by the SEC for conduct
during the class period before the filing of the complaint;
0 otherwise
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APPENDIX: Continued
Variable
Abnormal insider trading
Earnings warning
Positive forecast
Negative forecast
Avg. tenure
Busy
Independent
Audit meetings
Independent audit
Market cap.
Turnover
Abnormal min. return
HiTech
High volume court
Shares purchased less shares sold during the class period by
directors, CEOs, COOs, CFOs, presidents, and
vice-presidents less the same measure for the number of
days in the class period preceding the class period
Indicator variable equal to 1 if firm made a negative
forecast on either the class end or minimum return
dates; 0 otherwise
Indicator variable equal to 1 if firm made a positive forecast
during the class period; 0 otherwise
Indicator variable equal to 1 if firm made a negative
forecast during the class period other than on the
minimum return date or the end of the class period; 0
otherwise
Mean number of years that outside directors have been on
board
Mean number of external directorships of public
companies held by outside directors
Percentage of outside directors on the firm's board
Number of meetings held by the audit committee
Percentage of outside directors on the audit committee
Log of market value of common equity (in $ millions,
adjusted for inflation to year 2000 dollars) at the end of
the fiscal year preceding the beginning of the class
period
1 - (1 -Turn)x, where Turn is average daily trading volume
divided by the number of shares outstanding, and X is
the number of trading days during the class period
Minimum one-day return during the class period plus one
day after the end of the class period, adjusted for the
market return
Indicator variable equal to 1 if the firm is in the SIC codes
3570-3577 or 7370-7379; 0 otherwise
Indicator variable equal to 1 if the lawsuit is in the SDNY,
SD Cal, ND Cal, CD Cal ; 0 otherwise
Description
The governance variables are obtained from the last available proxy statement preceding the
beginning of the class period, if available; if not, the first available proxy after the beginning of
the class period was used.
